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Bitcoin: The First Self-Regulating Currency? 
 
Samuel Elliott* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article provides an examination of regulation theory as applied to Bitcoin. Through an 
examination of the parallels with Ogus’ model for self-regulation, it is demonstrated that several 
unique features inherent to cryptocurrencies offer the benefits of regulatory oversight without the 
drawbacks. The article also provides a broader socio-regulatory analysis of Bitcoin in an attempt 
to better understand the benefits of competitive self-regulation for platform users. Finally, this 
article examines whether cryptocurrencies should be regulated by way of traditional State-based 
models and, if so, which of these approaches (if any) ought to be used to regulate the platform.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ogus’ model of self-regulation relies on three environmental factors being 
present: that the activity is affected by some form of market failure; that private 
law instruments are inadequate or inefficient to correct said failure; and that self-
regulation is a better method of resolving the failure than conventional 
regulation.1 However, such self-regulation has been conceptualised as all-but-
impossible in e-commerce. Our understanding of ownership over intangible 
goods has been intimately linked to the ability to enforce and alienate our property 
rights through trusted third parties.2 Bitcoin has been challenging this conception 
since its launch. 
                                                             
* Graduate of the London School of Economics (LLM Eur, 2017). Graduate of Dublin 
City University (BCL Law and Society, 2015) Pre-Trainee at Matheson, Dublin, Ireland 
(2017). My thanks to Professor Andrew Murray for his assistance in understanding the 
legal issues surrounding Bitcoin. Further thanks to Killian Mills and Sean Gibbons in 
helping to conceptualize the technical background to cryptocurrencies. 
1 Anthony I Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’ (1995) 15 OJLS 97. 
2 Ranging from a bank carrying out an electronic transfer to a Court enforcing ownership 
of IP rights. 
 
58 Bitcoin: The First Self-Regulating Currency? Vol. 3 
 
Satoshi Nakamoto3 published Bitcoin’s ‘proof of concept’ in 2008.4 
Nakamoto notes therein that ‘commerce on the internet has come to rely almost 
exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties’.5 He argues 
that the need for a centralised intermediary creates inherent inefficiencies for the 
digital transfer of wealth. To address this inefficiency, an alternative system, built 
upon cryptographic proof rather than trust, was proposed, allowing for direct 
peer-to-peer transfers without the risk of double spending.6 Since then, Bitcoin 
has seen exponential growth among users who are sceptical of State interference 
and regulation in currency. There is no government, company, or bank in charge 
of the management of Bitcoin.7 This, however, neither means that the platform is 
entirely anarchistic nor that it is unregulated as such. Building on Ogus’ model, 
this article argues that Bitcoin is the first truly self-regulating currency. It resolves 
a number of inefficiencies within intermediary-based transfers through a 
decentralised, participatory model of regulation.  
Instead, through an examination of Bitcoin’s sui generis features, we can 
identify a number of parallels between the participatory currency and traditional 
regulatory models. We see that Bitcoin is underpinned by an implicit social 
contract wherein consensus-building and voluntary association replace 
centralised, rule-based forms of regulation. Thereafter, we will establish what the 
best means for regulating the platform are, which includes investigating the total 
deregulation of cryptocurrencies altogether. 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 The creator of Bitcoin – though Nakamoto is widely believed to be a pseudonym. For 
the sake of convenience, I have assumed Nakamoto to be male throughout this article. 
4 Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ 
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 28 February 2017. 
5 ibid 1. 
6 Double spending is a problem within digital currencies wherein units of currency, 
represented as files, may be spent more than once through duplication or falsification of 
the same. See Usman W Chohan, ‘The Double-Spending Problem and Cryptocurrencies’ 
(2017) University of NSW Discussion Papers Series 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090174> accessed 21 
February 2018. 
7 Primavera De Filippi, ‘Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream’ (2014) 
3 Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info/node/286/pdf> accessed 26 April 
2017. 
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I. OGUS’ MODEL AND THE STATUS QUO 
 
By examining the first two aspects of Ogus’ model, one can see how the failings 
of the ledger-based status quo paved the way for Bitcoin’s success. The market 
failure inherent in the trust-based model, and the inability of private law and 
alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) mechanisms to efficiently resolve 
ownership contentions, is inherently disadvantageous for transferors and 
transferees alike.  
 
The Inefficiency Problem: Market Failures and the Status Quo 
Prior to the invention of blockchain technology, inequality in power between 
financial service providers and end-users made self-regulation of currency 
impossible. The need for intermediary bodies and the lack of accessible 
infrastructure for verification of transfers at the individual level made the 
centralised system the most efficient method of regulation. However, together, 
the aforementioned led to a market failure insofar that the digital transfer of 
wealth became inherently inefficient. Such inefficiency has been compounded by 
in-house dispute resolution processes and courts serving as the sole method 
through which ownership conflicts, arising out of the intangible nature of the 
assets, could be resolved.  
Naturally, the exchange of physical assets, eg currency, does not 
necessitate a third party intermediary. Both parties can immediately verify that the 
correct transfer occurred and it cannot typically be reversed without legal action 
or physical force. The tangibility of the goods exchanged serves to verify the 
transaction. The only real risk of fraud, as regards the currency itself, comes in the 
form of counterfeiting. There is neither a functional need for an intermediary nor 
for significant regulation – both parties use a common platform and the only 
necessary rules are the established property laws within a State. 
For distance transactions, both parties face issues of opaqueness. As the 
exchange of physical goods cannot be easily carried out, a substitute must be used 
instead. Typically, this manifests in the form of a card payment or digital wire 
transfer. In other words, there is no physical exchange of value. During these 
transactions, instead, the intermediary logs the transfer against a ledger of each 
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party’s wealth.8 Without this trusted ledger, either party could ‘double spend’ 
digital currencies by way of repeatedly replicating and alienating them.9  
However, the intermediary-based system has disadvantages. Nakamoto 
argues that institutions cannot avoid regulating their platforms and mediating 
disputes due to the inherently trust-based nature of the model.10 This, as this paper 
submits, is the root cause of the lack of permanency in transfers. As responsibility 
must be vested in the intermediary, it must equally be able to resolve any conflicts 
that arise, thereby creating inherent inefficiencies in transactions. The 
intermediary-based system therefore carries three distinct disadvantages for 
transactors: (1) a lack of efficiency; (2) a lack of immutability; and (3) the potential 
for interference by the intermediary.11 These are the key aspects of the market 
failure that Bitcoin seeks to overcome. 
 
Private Law Issues and Dispute Resolution  
The second trigger for public interest in self-regulation is when private law 
instruments are inadequate or too costly to correct the market failure.12 Private 
law is suited to resolve issues relating to physical transfers. The risk of fraud, at 
least in terms of the currency itself, is relatively low and double spending is non-
existent, as each party can instantly verify whether the correct payment (or goods) 
has been obtained. 
Digital transfers present a number of issues for transferors in terms of 
disputes. Information asymmetry is a problem insofar that the transferee relies 
entirely on the intermediary to verify the transfer. With the control over the 
transfer vested in the intermediary, the surety of ownership and of transfer is 
impossible without reference to the trusted third party. Ensuring that these 
intermediaries act fairly becomes a matter for State oversight, guaranteeing that 
the financial market is not paralysed by a lack of trust.  
Nakamoto, for example, notes that there is no way to make non-reversible 
payments for non-reversible services.13 This creates inefficiencies. Intermediaries, 
                                                             
8 Jerry Brito and Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers (Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University 2013) 5. 
9 ibid. 
10 For example, non-reversible payments cannot be made for non-reversible transactions. 
11 Brito and Castillo (n 8) 5. 
12 Ogus (n 1) 97. 
13 Nakamoto (n 4) 1. 
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possessing total control over their centralised ledger, are also responsible for the 
establishment of ownership where disputes arise. Private law instruments are, in 
this instance, a fallback for the attribution of ownership where disputes cannot be 
resolved though the parties’ consent. However, regardless as to how advantageous 
ADR is in resolving transactional conflicts, there is no absolute guarantee of 
ownership. Brito, furthermore, notes that the cost of chargeback fraud and the 
accompanying charges can be a prohibitive barrier to small businesses seeking to 
enter the digital market.14 
 
Digital Currency Pre-Bitcoin  
Next, it is worth briefly examining the history of digital currency pre-Bitcoin to 
contextualise those advancements made to address key issues surrounding 
decentralisation.  
The technology at the heart of cryptocurrencies was envisaged in 1992, 
when retired physicist Timothy May convened a number of colleagues to discuss 
decentralising digital currency.15 Heavily influenced by anarchistic and libertarian 
philosophy, the group proposed a platform for digital payments beyond the realm 
of banks, credit card companies, and other intermediaries. Jim Bell, a member of 
the early cryptography community, posited a thought experiment wherein 
anonymous digital currency was used to crowdfund ‘assassination politics’ against 
unpopular politicians.16  
Although Bell’s paper ultimately resulted in an IRS raid and led the author 
to be imprisoned for several years, it offers valuable insight into the early 
motivation of developers like Nakamoto. These developers feared that the 
newfound freedoms the Internet offered their community would, in time, be 
curtailed through government oversight and control over spending.17 Public key 
encryption and ‘digital cash’ offered the opportunity to build institutions free 
from governmental control, wherein the only limit to what could be bought and 
sold was the physical limits of the providers themselves.  
                                                             
14 Brito and Castillo (n 8) 15. 
15 Morgen E Peck, ‘Bitcoin: The Cryptoanarchists’ Answer to Cash’ (IEEE, 30 May 2012) 
<http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/bitcoin-the-cryptoanarchists-answer-
to-cash/0> accessed 3 May 2017. 
16 Jim Bell, ‘Assassination Politics’ (1992) <http://www.outpost-of-
freedom.com/jimbellap.htm> accessed 3 May 2017. 
17 ibid. 
 
62 Bitcoin: The First Self-Regulating Currency? Vol. 3 
 
It was in 1997 that Nick Szabo developed the first proto-cryptocurrency.18 
Szabo, similar to Bell, started with a thought experiment on what gave gold its 
value. He drew an analogy between difficult-to-mine gold and difficult-to-solve 
problems. A puzzle that takes time and energy to solve, with the solution then 
presented in the form of a digital coin, can be considered valuable in a way similar 
to gold.19 As the network built incrementally on resolved puzzles, a chain of 
solutions – the blockchain – formed, which served the double purpose of also 
timestamping transactions. The network, unable to proceed to the next puzzle 
without having answered the preceding, guarded against ‘double spending’ and 
‘double mining’.  
Szabo’s Bit Gold was a departure from the norm of digital currencies. The 
earlier DigiCash, also based on cryptography, relied on a centralised bank for 
oversight. Szabo, seeking to replicate gold, envisioned Bit Gold to hold value as a 
standalone asset. Instead of having their value backed and, thus, arguably 
generated by banks, cryptocurrencies would be inherently valuable based on the 
input required to resolve the digital puzzle.  
Bit Gold was an imperfect solution for the market issues present within e-
commerce. While it did provide some fundamental protection against double 
spending, the system was based on a quorum of network addresses.20 Networks, 
however, are vulnerable to, most importantly in this case, ‘Sybil attacks’, where an 
attacker forges a number of network addresses with which they can take control 
over the network as a whole.21 This vulnerability prevented widespread adoption 
of the digital currency, given there was little security against this form of cyber 
attack. At the time, forging an identity was relatively easy, making a truly 
decentralised and collaborative means of regulation impossible. It was not until 
Nakamoto’s innovations in blockchain technology that Sybil attacks could be 
prevented altogether and a secure, decentralised digital currency became possible. 
These innovations are discussed below. 
                                                             
18 Nick Szabo, ‘Bit Gold’ (Unenumerated, 27 December 2008) 
<http://unenumerated.blogspot.ie/2005/12/bit-gold.html> accessed 21 February 
2018. 
19 ibid.  
20 Nick Szabo, ‘Secure Property Tiles with Owner Authority’ (Satoshi Nakamoto Institute, 
1998) <http://nakamotoinstitute.org/secure-property-titles> accessed 3 May 2017. 
21 John R Douceur, ‘The Sybil Attack’ in Peter Drushel, M Frans Kaashoek and Antony 
IT Rowstron (eds), IPTPS ‘01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-
Peer Systems (Springer-Verlag 2002). 
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II. SELF-REGULATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE STATUS QUO 
INEFFICIENCIES 
 
To comprehend the significance of the departure from the status quo Bitcoin 
represents, it is important to understand the technological developments 
underlying the cryptocurrency. Nakamoto found the core issues within the 
intermediary model to derive from the need for a trusted third party.22 
 
Technical Description of Bitcoin 
Rather than representing each transaction using a centralised ledger, Nakamoto 
created a standalone digital currency. Each Bitcoin is a representation of a chain 
of digital signatures. Transfers are carried out by digitally signing an 
algorithmically-generated number, a ‘hash’, of the previous transaction and the 
unique public cryptographic key (‘public key’) of the next owner, and appending 
this to the previous end of the coin.23 Public-key cryptography allows each node 
in the network to verify whether a digitally signed transaction is valid.24 To prevent 
double spending, Nakamoto uses a publicly distributed ledger system. The ledger 
timestamps each transaction within the network, ensuring a coin cannot be 
repeatedly transacted by one owner – thus solving the double-spending 
problem.25 New transactions are broadcast to other nodes within the network, 
which collate them into a block, hence the label ‘blockchain’.  
Nodes, then, work on finding a difficult proof-of-work for each block. 
Once discovered, a new Bitcoin is created and added to the ledger. This requires 
nodes to discover a value that, when hashed using the SHA-256 algorithm, begins 
with a string of zero bits – a computationally intensive task whose success is easy 
to verify.26 The proof-of-work serves to timestamp transactions and to ensure that 
the network reaches consensus on which transactions have entered the 
blockchain. Once a node discovers a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to the 
network. The block, in turn, will only be accepted if all transactions within the 
block are valid and not double-spent. The latter serves to verify broadcast 
transactions while simultaneously generating new Bitcoin. It also ensures that 
                                                             
22 ibid.  
23 ibid 252. 
24 Brito and Castillo (n 8) 5. 
25 Nakamoto (n 4) 2.  
26 This value is called a nonce.  
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consensus is built amongst the nodes which prevents conflicting ledgers, called 
‘network forks’.27 Nodes then create the next block in the chain by using the hash 
of the accepted block.28 This process secures the network against attackers, who 
would have to modify the proof-of-work for every previous transaction within 
the chain in order to modify the ledger.  
As discovering the nonce is computationally intensive, Bitcoins are 
inherently scarce. There is no central authority to distribute them. Instead, wealth 
is generated through contributing to the maintenance of the network. 
Furthermore, if the output value of a transaction is less than the input value, a 
transaction fee can be added to the incentive value of the block containing the 
transaction.29 This allows the platform to remain viable after the last Bitcoin is 
‘mined’.30 Every 210,000 blocks, the value of creating a new block is halved, 
limiting the supply of Bitcoins over time.31 
The network will analyse the time taken to mine 2016 blocks periodically. 
The problem difficulty will then be adjusted to ensure that mining those blocks 
takes close to two weeks to complete. Doing so ensures that Bitcoin are mined at 
a manageable pace despite the advances in processing power that become 
available to miners. As such, Bitcoin retains its value in response to external 
factors like Moore’s law32 and developments in hardware.33 
 
                                                             
27 Nicolas Houy, ‘The Bitcoin Mining Game’ (2016) 1 Ledger 53. Network forks have 
happened – both intentionally and unintentionally – a number of times during Bitcoin’s 
lifespan. 
28 Nakamoto (n 4) 2. 
29 ibid. 
30 Once 20,999,999.9769 Bitcoins have been added to the Blockchain, the currency will 
become entirely reliant on transaction fees to maintain the ledger. This is estimated to 
happen circa 2140.  
31 Jocab Donnelly, ‘What is the ‘Halving’? A Primer to Bitcoin’s Big Mining Change’ 
(coindesk, 12 June 2016) <http://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-bitcoins-halving> 
accessed 26 April 2017.  
32 Moore predicted that the number of circuit components that can be arranged on an 
integrated chip would double in number year on year. To date, Moore’s Law has served 
to predict the exponential growth in processing power of modern hardware relatively 
well. See Chris Mack, ‘The Multiple Lives of Moore’s Law’ (2015) 52 IEEE Spectrum 
31. 
33 For further background information, see the discussion on Stackexchange 
<https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/5838/how-is-difficulty-calculated> 
accessed 23 February 2018. 
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Ogus and Bitcoin: Is Bitcoin Self-Regulating?  
Retuning to Ogus, we can examine whether Bitcoin falls within the model of a 
self-regulating entity.34 Thereafter, the effectiveness of Bitcoin to resolve the 
market failure within intermediary transactions can be scrutinised. 
Ogus argues that there is a ‘multitude of institutional arrangements which 
can properly be described as self-regulation’.35 He rejects the traditionalists’ view, 
limited to a Self-Regulating Authority (‘SRA’) removed from the body politic, as 
too narrowly conceived. Instead, Ogus holds there to be a self-regulatory 
spectrum, ranging from bodies being entirely self-regulating to public regulation.36 
At one extreme, self-regulating bodies may be subject to government oversight. 
At the other, these may be entirely independent and private.37 Furthermore, the 
rules could be formally (legally) binding or purely voluntary. Finally, regimes can 
be monopolistic or voluntary. The main difference between a self-regulating and 
publically regulated model is, therefore, the origin of rulemaking within a system 
– the enforcement and effect of these rules thereafter can vary.  
Bitcoin steps beyond Ogus’ conception of self-regulation insofar as it 
surpasses the need for a centralised authority altogether. The distributed ledger, 
moreover, provides security of ownership and guarantees against fraud. Rather 
than having fiscal controls on the creation of new currency, Bitcoin automatically 
reduces the output of mining over time at a predetermined rate.  
Transactions are verified and encoded into the blockchain through a 
participatory community model wherein consensus is built amongst the network. 
Such a verification system departs from the traditional regulatory model and 
Ogus’ conception of an SRA. Basic rules of ownership and the transfer of assets 
are not enforced by a court or regulator, but instead by nodes through the 
codification of the ledger.38 Participation is encouraged through the reward of 
new Bitcoins, thereby creating a feedback loop of wealth creation and currency 
management.39  
                                                             
34 Ogus (n 1) 97. 
35 ibid 99. 
36 ibid 100. 
37 ibid.  
38 Houy (n 27) 53. 
39 ibid. Houy’s article reflects on Bitcoin mining through the lens of game theory, which 
provides context as to the motivations for each individual miner. 
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However, whilst enforcement is decentralised, decision-making is not. 
Although Bitcoin’s codebase is open source, Nakamoto made many of the key 
decisions as to how the platform ought to operate.40 Following Nakamoto’s 
retirement in 2010, governance of the codebase was handed to Gavin Andresen, 
who created the non-profit Bitcoin Foundation thereafter.41 Thus, while Bitcoin 
might be decentralised in terms of participation, the development and direction 
of the project has been centralised in a limited number of developers, resulting in 
a number of controversial decisions, including forks in the codebase in 2015 and 
2017.42 
 
Competitive Self-Regulation and Forks in the Codebase  
The Bitcoin Foundation can be viewed as analogous to an SRA. When a user forks 
the codebase, they create a platform that competes with Bitcoin Core. The original 
platform, however, is unaffected in terms of its functionality. Use of the new 
platform is entirely optional, giving transferors the ability to use whichever 
cryptocurrency they feel is most suitable for their needs. Here, one can draw a 
parallel with Ogus’ commentary on competitive self-regulation.43 Ogus asserts 
that the principal objection to SRAs is their ability to exploit their monopolistic 
control of the regulatory environment.  
Ogus’ solution was to allow for competition between different regimes, 
thus formulating standards that ‘meet consumer preferences at lowest cost’.44 He 
finds inspiration in the Coase Theorem, which demonstrates that allocative 
                                                             
40 Matt Odell, ‘A Solution to Bitcoin’s Governance Problem’ (techcrunch.com, 21 September 
2015) <https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/21/a-solution-to-bitcoins-governance-
problem/> accessed 26 April 2017.  
41 Jon Matonis, ‘Bitcoin Foundation Launches to Drive Bitcoin’s Advancement’ (Forbes, 
27 September 2012) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/09/27/bitcoin-foundation-
launches-to-drive-bitcoins-advancement/#7903735d8683> accessed 26 April 2017. 
42 Alex Hern, ‘Bitcoin’s Forked: Chief Scientist Launches Alternative Proposal for the 
Currency’ The Guardian (London, 17 August 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/17/bitcoin-xt-alternative-
cryptocurrency-chief-scientist> accessed 26 April 2017; Jack Crosbie, ‘When Will 
Bitcoin Fork, and What’s It Mean for Crypto’s Future?’ (Inverse Innovation, 26 July 2017) 
<https://www.inverse.com/article/34693-bitcoin-hard-fork-soft-fork-explained-
august-1> accessed 1 December 2017. 
43 Ogus (n 1) 103.   
44 ibid.  
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efficiency will be achieved through voluntary market transactions, regardless of 
how the law is formulated.45 This allocative efficiency is subject to transaction 
costs and to externalities such as, for example, market interests among 
participants.46 
A sufficiently talented programmer, or group thereof, can modify the 
source code of Bitcoin to create a hard fork in the platform.47 Forking the Bitcoin 
codebase creates two parallel blockchains, containing both the original and the 
new coins mined thereafter. Forking allows for competition among offshoots of 
the project. This allows for preferred platforms, with modified rules on the 
creation and governance of digital currencies, to prevail over less efficient 
competitors.  
As costs relating to creating and migrating to a different fork are minimal, 
if not absent, there are no practical barriers to those users unhappy with the 
established rules. However, as Bitcoin is mined using processing power, a forked 
offshoot requires continued user investment to remain sustainable. If a currency 
cannot achieve critical mass, it is unlikely to be successful. Externalities, usually in 
the form of disagreements amongst the userbase, have caused several offshoots 
of the network to fail to reach this critical mass.48  
 
Decentralisation of Regulation, Black, and Ogus 
Black argues that the State is not the sole source of regulation and deems 
regulation to be inherently limiting, given that there are a number of sources that 
produce similar rulemaking with similar influence over behaviour.49 She identifies 
three generally accepted understandings of what regulation entails. In the first, 
regulation equates to ‘the promulgation of rules by government, accompanied by 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement’.50 The second conceptualises 
regulation as any form of direct State intervention in the economy. In the third 
                                                             
45 ibid 100. 
46 ibid. 
47 Amy Castor, ‘A Short Guide to Bitcoin Forks’ (coindesk, 27 March 2017) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/short-guide-bitcoin-forks-explained/> accessed 28 April 
2017. 
48 Bitcoin XT – by way of example – was a 2015 fork that failed to attract critical mass, 
despite resolving a number of inherent technical issues within Bitcoin core.  
49 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) CARR Discussion Papers DP 4 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35985/1/Disspaper4-1.pdf> accessed 28 April 2017.  
50 ibid 8. 
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sense, regulation extends to all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting 
all aspects of behaviour from whatever source.51 
The first two conceptualisations of regulation exclude private rulemaking 
by nature. The third is more inclusive, but risks being so expansive that it renders 
the definition moot. If any form of influence is regulation, then framing the term 
becomes effectively pointless. Black restricts the third definition by noting the 
implicit understanding that regulation targets economic actors.52 She builds on 
Ogus’ argument that regulation is best understood ‘by reference to different 
systems of economic organization and the legal forms which maintain them’.53  
Instead of framing regulation as a directive system, of commands backed 
by sanctions, we can understand it as facilitating the market.54 It provides a set of 
‘formalised arrangements with which individuals can ‘“clothe” their (…) 
relationships’.55 This conceptualisation of regulation allows for decentralisation. 
Regulation is understood as rulemaking that influences markets in terms of 
providing convergent standards for the actors therein. Ogus argues that this 
definition falls short insofar that it ignores the role the State plays in facilitating 
the existence of such a system.56 Such a definition cannot properly describe the 
role that regulation plays in governing market behaviour by itself, as ‘traditional 
law’ serves to provide the stability necessary for the market to exist in the first 
place.  
The parameters under which nodes recognise the creation and transfer of 
Bitcoin can be understood under Ogus’ incomplete definition. Akin to more 
traditional forms of regulation, these rules provide a means by which users can 
recognise the creation and ownership of wealth. The network remains functional 
by requiring users to contribute CPU power to adding transactions to the 
blockchain. Likewise, the self-adjusting parameters by which the network 
moderates the creation of new blocks ensure stability of price by creating scarcity. 
These ‘regulations’ ensure that Bitcoin remains stable, functional, and valuable. 
Similar to Black’s first conception of regulation, there is a clear body tasked 
with the monitoring and enforcement of these rules across the platform. 
                                                             
51 ibid. 
52 ibid 10. 
53 Anthony I Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (OUP 1994) 1. 
54 ibid 2. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid 3. 
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However, rather than having a single centralised body for enforcement, Bitcoin 
tasks every node on the network with transactional verification, ie whether 
transactions have followed the ‘regulations’ that render them valid.  
It is arguably difficult to conceptualise ‘rulebreaking’ within the context of 
cryptocurrencies. Functionally, double spending is not possible, as nodes within 
the network will simply refuse to recognise such transactions. If one opts to 
participate, users are bound by the rules of the platform.  
 
The Social Contract and the Blockchain – Bitcoin as a Sovereign 
Reijers, O’Brolcháin and Haynes argue that blockchain governance parallels 
traditional governance in terms of legitimacy.57 Examining the Hobbesian ‘state 
of nature’, the authors hold that the foundation of the blockchain is built upon 
isolated individuals of roughly equal power and capacity.58  
Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ considers life without government. Therein, the 
world is one of ‘perfectly private judgement’ wherein no one agency is authorised 
to resolve disputes or enforce decisions.59 He argues that man is subject to 
uncertainty in terms of other man.60 This prevents individuals from properly 
realising their wants and needs in societal terms. In terms of rational self-interest, 
humans can see that there is both an individual and collective good when it comes 
to peace seeking and the authority from which it derives. Through recognising 
and formally realising principles of natural law as a collective, authority is imbued 
with institutional legitimacy. The end result is a sovereign body, comprised of 
individuals following a common authority, sacrificing the ‘right of nature’ (of pure 
liberty) to institutionally recognise the law of nature.61 
The intermediary system mirrors the Hobbesean state of nature. Property 
can only exist in terms of a sovereign power capable of ensuring equal terms 
among its users.62 Although e-commerce platforms are not sovereign in terms of 
power, these do maintain total technical control over the property of others and 
                                                             
57 Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin and Paul Haynes, ‘Governance in Blockchain 
Technologies & Social Contract Theories’ (2016) 1 Ledger 134.  
58 ibid 138.  
59 Sharon A Lloyd and Suzanne Sreedhar, ‘Hobbes’ Moral and Political Philosophy’, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-
moral/> accessed 1 May 2017. 
60 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, Penguin 1985) ch 13. 
61 ibid chs 17-31. 
62 Equal terms here means equity in the ability to alienate and receive property rights. 
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are, in turn, governed by a State that derives its legitimacy from individuals. 
Contemporary platforms serve as an answer to the Hobbesean state of nature that 
was the commerce on the early Internet. Individuals relied on representative 
ledgers to provide verification of and arbitration in transactions. However, as this 
exists as a private service, the State is empowered with regulatory oversight. This 
provides weak legitimacy to a platform we recognise it as reliable and subject to 
rules of basic fairness, but at the cost of inefficiencies within the system. By way 
of example, disputes must be resolved through a consent-based dispute settlement 
process, an Ombudsman, or the court system. This also creates a lack of absolute 
surety in ownership, as there is no physical asset actually possessed. The digital 
wealth exists solely as a record in the intermediary’s ledger.  
Bitcoin changes the individual’s power in terms of the creation, ownership, 
and alienation of property rights. A sovereign entity is no longer necessary to 
guarantee these rights. Instead, by way of the functionality of the blockchain, any 
user can create and enforce property rights over Bitcoin. Users can alienate 
property with an absolute guarantee that ownership will be given to the transferee. 
Just as the individuals in Hobbes’ state of nature recognise sovereignty, users of 
Bitcoin recognise Nakamoto’s platform as providing this governance.  
Whilst it has been demonstrated that blockchain can exist parallel to 
traditional intermediary governance, we must examine whether it is functionally 
‘better’ than the status quo. In terms of legitimacy, blockchain removes the effect 
of indirect governance. The network is operated and enforced by the users rather 
than through a democratic or technocratic system of government. It operates 
more akin a mandatory social contract, wherein inherently agreed upon terms 
within the system can be accepted simply by participating therein.  
Rather than subjecting users to the alienation of individual control 
inherent in the intermediary system, the decentralised nature of the blockchain 
allows absolute permanence and control over currency. The network exists 
subject only to the platform maintaining a base level of participation. As the 
generation of wealth actively requires the network to be powered, there remains 
a demand-incentive to contribute to the administrative tasks that facilitate 
transactions. The effective removal (or great reduction) of cost at the individual 
level provides for vastly more direct and efficient means by which property rights 
can be expressed. However, it should be noted that the increase in popularity in 
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Bitcoin in late 2017 resulted in mining becoming exponentially more resource-
intensive (especially as regards electricity and hardware usage).63 
The core aspect of ‘legitimacy’ in terms of e-commerce platforms is the 
ability to efficiently facilitate the transfer of property. Bitcoin derives its legitimacy 
through the guarantee, through cryptography and decentralisation, that 
individuals can express their rights. An intermediary system relies on legitimate 
State enforcement of the law, expressed through control over providers. It is 
arguable that the blockchain provides more immediate and effective ‘legitimacy’, 
as it removes human inefficiency of transfers. The digital transfer of wealth is fully 
vested in the individual, rather than being granted by an intermediary. 
It is useful to briefly examine O’Dwyer’s analysis of Bitcoin as a 
commons.64 O’Dwyer argues that ‘contribution to the blockchain doesn’t only 
produce money, it also reproduces the community, strengthening a community of 
trust’.65 As the network is protected against cyber attacks due to the increasing 
complexity of the blockchain, it derives legitimacy from participation. The 
network, in other words, is insulated by the users themselves rather than by a 
Hobbesean Leviathan or other centralised figure.  
 
III. REGULATING BITCOIN – SHOULD WE? 
 
Having established the models of legitimacy vested in theoretical regulatory 
regimes, we can now turn to the practical aspects of Bitcoin regulation. Brito, in 
this regard, warns that Bitcoin ‘exists in something of a legal grey area’.66 It neither 
fits in current statutory definitions of currency nor have policymakers been quick 
to implement practical controls regulating the purchase and use of Bitcoins.  
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Brito compares the regulatory discourse during the early days of VoIP 
technology to the contemporary debate on cryptocurrencies.67 Early VoIP 
technology, so too, fell beyond the regulatory scope of the US Federal 
Communications Commission (‘FCC’). The technology competed with a highly 
regulated but technologically limited legacy network. Like Bitcoin, VoIP provided 
a cheap, direct, and unregulated means for individuals to interact peer-to-peer. 
Both Congress and the FCC struggled to respond to the emergent 
technology in terms of policy decisions. However, by charting a path that clarified 
the regulatory ambiguity whilst avoiding saddling VoIP providers with a heavy 
regulatory burden, the technology has flourished. Competition, moreover, has 
been restored to a stagnant market, lowering costs and providing increased 
efficiency for end-users. Brito argues that a similar approach ought to be taken 
for cryptocurrency regulation.68 
To appreciate the particulars of a regulatory model, however, we must 
examine the power struggle between the inherently decentralised network of the 
blockchain, on the one hand, and centralised regulators, on the other. Bitcoin in 
particular has seen early attention from a number of regulators, including the 
European Parliament69 and the IMF.70 As these bodies seek to bring the network 
within the prerogative of oversight applied to the more traditional financial 
bodies, a number of functional and political challenges present themselves. 
 
Justifying Centralised Regulation 
Proponents of centralised oversight over Bitcoin lean toward a few models of 
regulation in particular; either arguing for absolute regulatory control, akin a fiat 
currency, or for hybridised models of oversight. In establishing where this balance 
should fall, regulatory proponents typically look to a discreet set of benefits and 
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risks.71 The IMF, for example, recognises the driving force new technology 
possesses and understands the appeal of direct peer-to-peer to technology for the 
financial sector, given the cost advantages of eliminating central clearinghouses. 
Likewise, the IMF realises the broader benefits distributed ledger technologies can 
have to strengthen financial efficiency in terms of cross-border – and other 
traditionally costly – transactions.72 
However, the IMF similarly identifies a number of negative consequences 
of cryptocurrencies, namely: money laundering, terrorist financing, and tax 
evasion through cryptocurrency platforms.73 Turpin argues that the decentralised 
nature of the currency, alongside the legal ambiguity within which it operates, has 
made it particularly attractive for illegal transactions.74 The relative ease by which 
evidence of ownership can be disguised created a market for Bitcoin laundering 
(or ‘tumbling’) services on the dark web.75 
Soska and Christin’s analysis of darknet markets provides some insight 
into the economic motivations for law enforcement oversight.76 The Silk Road, 
before its takedown, grossed approximately $300,000 per day.77 The authors 
further note that there is high mobility for vendors in terms of accessing various 
sites. With no barrier to ‘opening up shop’ on several marketplaces, it is common 
practice for vendors to hedge their bets against takedowns or other errors.78  
This in mind, it is understandable that Bitcoin has attracted much 
regulatory and law enforcement attention. The significance of the transactions 
facilitated, its pseudonymous nature, and the relative difficulty of removing 
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entrenched darknet markets without a means of controlling their income, makes 
such interest reasonable. The logical step, in terms of preventing illegal activity, 
would be to have some form of oversight. However, such an approach has a 
number of inherent problems. 
 
Difficulties in Centralised Regulation 
The inherent difficulties in monitoring transactions that use Bitcoin have been 
noted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’).79 Of particular concern was 
the lack of a centralised body to carry out due diligence, monitoring and reporting 
of suspicious activity, anti-money laundering compliance, and the receiving and 
processing of legal requests – the primary means by which US regulatory bodies 
maintain oversight over financial institutions.80 This represents an intelligence gap 
for law enforcement insofar that the latter remains reliant on reporting and 
traditional compliance roles to detect financial crime.  
Even though some oversight is possible through the regulation of Bitcoin 
exchanges, such supervision remains subject to its jurisdictional limits. This 
approach, furthermore, relies on Bitcoin exchanges falling within the definition 
of a ‘money transmitter’ under Federal and State law.81 Finally, supervision is 
limited in that it only works when users actually use the exchange – mining and 
spending Bitcoin is possible without using these services.  
Identifying users on the network remains a work-intensive process. Reid 
and Harrigan managed to identify users by statistically analysing the data sets 
attached to the blockchain alongside user postings of public-private keys.82 This 
method is imperfect, relying on user error rather than weaknesses in 
cryptocurrencies, and can be safeguarded against by using laundering or tumbling 
techniques. Overall, the statistical approach is too impractical for consistent law 
enforcement usage beyond specific high-priority instances.  
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Even traditional responses to illegal activity (eg seizures) are much more 
difficult to effectuate once cryptocurrencies are involved. Transferring Bitcoin out 
of a wallet requires the corresponding private key. In other words, it either 
requires the cooperation from the wallet owner or access to a source containing 
the key, ie, a physical or digital record of it.83 When an FBI operation closed the 
Silk Road in 2013, approximately 26,000 Bitcoins held in escrow on the site could 
be seized and transferred to the FBI’s wallet. However, the 600,000 Bitcoins 
stored in the personal wallet of alleged site operator Robert Ulbricht could not be 
accessed.84 This renders approaches such as asset freezing or seizure insufficient, 
given the impossibility of alienating Bitcoin ownership without access to a user’s 
private key. On top of that, various levels of protection exist worldwide in terms 
of States’ abilities to compel individuals to provide passwords.85  
This difficulty in enforcement of financial controls has resulted in a 
number of countries making the purchase and use of Bitcoin illegal.86 The Central 
Bank of Bolivia, for example, stated that it is ‘illegal to sue any kind of currency 
that is not issued and controlled by a government or authorized entity’.87 Likewise, 
Bangladesh banned cryptocurrencies under the country’s strict anti-money 
laundering regime.88 While cryptocurrencies largely exist in a legal void, under-
resourced States may seek to outlaw them rather than resorting to costly or labour-
intensive means of regulating transactions. 
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Should Bitcoin Be Regulated as a Currency? 
The difficulties in enforcement and regulation are reflective of the lens through 
which cryptocurrencies are viewed. The FBI criticises the currency, viewing it as 
a financial instrument or asset, rather than a sui generis currency. Brito asserts that 
this is due to the unique nature of Bitcoin, wherein it can be conceived of as either 
commodity or currency (or both).89 It would be unforeseeable – and so too hugely 
controversial – if a regulatory body were to attempt to oversee every form of 
transaction, both physical and digital, using a traditional currency. However, given 
the nature of Bitcoin as ‘physical-virtual’, this is exactly what is frequently 
proposed in calls to regulate it. As currency can be generated, moved, and stored 
across the entirety of the userbase without significant cost, attempting to regulate 
Bitcoin as a commodity is moot. 
He and colleagues argue that cryptocurrencies fall short of the legal 
concept of currency or money.90 The legal concept of currency is inherently tied 
to the power of a sovereign to build a legal framework for issuing banknotes and 
coins. Likewise, the authors argue that the power of the State to regulate the 
monetary system is a key feature of ‘legal money’. However, He and colleagues’ 
conception draws an arbitrary distinction between a number of features within 
cryptocurrency systems have that mirror the role of the State. Coins are still 
issued, albeit based on a collaborative exercise rather than the instructions of a 
sovereign. Rather than a legal framework surrounding the issuing of money, 
cryptocurrencies use computational power to regulate the creation of wealth. The 
network regulates the rate at which wealth is created through responsively 
adjusting the difficulty of mining. Further regulation is also possible. However, 
the network refuses to adopt it by continuing to use the Bitcoin Core platform 
rather than a forked project. Therefore, Bitcoin has the sovereign and regulatory 
model of a traditional currency – it is merely distributed amongst the entire 
userbase. 
Kaplanov explores a model wherein Bitcoin is treated as a legal alternative 
currency.91 He notes that, should this approach be adopted, Bitcoin would have 
parallels in other community currency systems across the US.92 Following Biscoe v 
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Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,93 the limits of the constitutional prohibition 
on the issuance of ‘bills of credit’ was drawn at the State level. Private persons, 
private partnerships, and private corporations remained unaffected in terms of 
their ability to create de novo currencies.94 Bitcoin, as a community regulated 
cryptocurrency, fits comfortably within the legal framework for a private currency 
within Federal law. However, Kaplanov points out that a number of States limit 
the use of alternative currencies – eg to prevent employees from being paid 
through a voucher system.95 
If we view Bitcoin through the lens of traditional currencies, it can be 
regulated under US foreign currencies regulation. Doing so would distinguish 
Bitcoin from other securities and would allow parties to register as foreign 
exchange dealers or futures commission merchants.96 In being treated as foreign 
currency, it would be regulated, but not be subject to the significant regulatory 
burden that couples domestic currency or securities. This approach implicitly 
recognises the nature of cryptocurrencies as regulated by the community rather 
than a centralised body and would see acceptance at the State level of self-
regulation. If Bitcoin is treated as a foreign currency, it is reasonable to argue that 
attempting to regulate the currency at the State level would be acting ultra vires. 
However, this relationship requires Federal deference to the participatory model. 
Instead of regulating, it requires the State to accept that the platform itself will 
regulate and that all decisions ultimately vest in the userbase. 
 
The Argument for De Minimis or No Regulation 
Kaplanov argues that there is a simple answer to address the friction between 
regulation and cryptocurrencies: deregulation.97 He argues that Nakamoto’s 
motivations – eliminating third-party inefficiencies, ease of storage and transport, 
inherent protection against forgery, and anonymity for the userbase – are the key 
advantages that drive users to use cryptocurrencies.98 Each of these advantages is 
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tied directly to issues within the trust-based model, which is propagated through 
State and private actors being reliant upon controlling the status quo.99  
Kaplanov examines a number of arguments presented against a heavily 
regulated market for Bitcoin in the US. Outlawing Bitcoin remains difficult. Being 
an open-source project, there is no company to raid, no persons to subpoena, or 
no one location to shut down.100 Likewise, taking down the website and removing 
the source code would do nothing to affect the underlying decentralised 
network.101 The only way to prevent the network from functioning at a technical 
level would be to remove all nodes from operation. Simply outlawing use of the 
platform itself would prove inadequate to prevent usage. Kaplanov argues that 
shutting down Bitcoin ‘would likely be very similar to the efforts done to stop 
online file-sharing programmes’.102 Efforts to shut down other peer-to-peer 
platforms have resulted in a largely unsuccessful arms race, wherein underlying 
features of programmes were tweaked to ensure compliance with rulings, while 
regulatory aims remained unfulfilled.103 This is particularly relevant for Bitcoin 
given its open-source nature and the forking of its codebase. It is unlikely that 
efforts to heavily regulate or shut down the platform be met with any permanent 
success.  
Kaplanov goes on to argue that the best approach to Bitcoin regulation is 
to ‘allow the market [to] determine whether or not [it] survive[s]’.104 
Cryptocurrencies have contributed to substantial growth in e-commerce, 
resolving a number of traditional issues in payment platforms in the process. 
Illegal activities aside, there are a significant number of legal exchanges and 
markets providing a range of services related to the platform.105 Kaplanov notes 
that, despite volatility, the userbase of Bitcoin demonstrates a demand for an 
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alternative currency not tied to government control or influence.106 Kaplanov’s 
approach can be compared to Hayek’s in the Denationalisation of Money, where the 
latter argues that competition among private currencies would ultimately 
guarantee a stable purchasing power and eliminate those less stable currencies 
from the market.107 
The social contract and self-regulatory models of Bitcoin have imbibed 
legitimacy in the currency for the userbase. The platform is not based on trust 
vested in a sovereign or a body under sovereign oversight, but on that of the users 
themselves. Every member of the network can verify that the platform is fair, 
egalitarian, and contributory. Such equality boosts trust in a network where 
traditional currencies may suffer.108 The participatory nature of the platform, 
furthermore, increases its strength as more users adopt it. Camera, in this regard, 
argues that unified monetary systems are a public good, promoting trade between 
individuals.109 However, should a number of currencies develop in parallel, all are 
devalued, with the userbase fragmenting. Therefore, the best ‘win-state’ for 
society is to have a single currency with as large a userbase as possible. This is the 
root logic under which State-based regulatory models for currency develop. 
Cryptocurrencies arguably present the next step in developing monetary systems 
that operate cross-border, wherein ownership is non-ambiguous by nature and 
instant transmission is allowed without the use of an intermediary. 
Rather than viewing Bitcoin as a hostile development that threatens 
traditional currencies, regulators should instead view it as an innovative next-
generation currency. It is in the best interest of policymakers to do so; Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies will always maintain a market among illegal vendors, but a 
favourable regulatory environment allows them to be predominantly used by 
legitimate users. The larger the userbase, the greater the economic gains derived 
from use of the currency. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In August 2017, Bitcoin’s exchange rate with the US Dollar passed $1400.110 This 
spike in value came as the Japanese cabinet approved a series of bills to facilitate 
the use of virtual currencies.111 These bills, effectively, rendered Bitcoin a legal 
means of payment. The spike in value associated with favourable sentiment 
surrounding regulation can be contrasted with the drop in value following 
announcements that the Chinese Government is to heavily restrict trading 
platforms for Bitcoin and other ‘altcoins’.112 What this clearly indicates is that the 
rising value of Bitcoin is directly tied to consumer confidence concerning its use. 
Through favourable regulatory developments worldwide, the value of the 
currency has continued to grow. Not only has this increased Bitcoin’s legitimacy, 
it also has transformed the currency from a mere technical project into a major 
contender with traditional currencies.  
Deregulation is the most effective model for States to approach 
cryptocurrencies. A parallel approach, wherein traditional currencies and digital 
currencies can coexist, allows both to flourish based on their own merits. The 
intermediary-based system of e-commerce is inherently inefficient and allowing 
cryptocurrencies to compete with them on the digital market provides significant 
benefits to consumers.  
Ongoing development of the platform (and community) remains 
precariously reliant on international regulatory responses. Both the EU and US 
have taken tentative forays into recognising Bitcoin’s benefits. However, a proper 
legal framework for trade in cryptocurrencies remains far off. That said, the 
resultant legal ambiguity has – surprisingly – benefitted the currency. A 
deregulated market means few barriers exist for new users and merchants to begin 
accepting the currency. This is helped through the emergence of several online 
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currency exchanges and markets, which have been unhindered in their aim to 
provide access to Bitcoin to the general public.  
The most practical applications of Bitcoin demonstrate the comparative 
value between decentralised and traditional currencies. For example, sending 
money internationally becomes significantly cheaper when Bitcoin is used as a 
platform.113 Other options, such as credit cards, wire transfers, Paypal (and 
comparable services), and money transmitters are costly due to the need for an 
intermediary. For much of the cryptocurrency’s history, the peer-to-peer 
exchanges upon which Bitcoin are based previously cost fractions of a dollar. 
However, the significant increase in the number of transactions on the Bitcoin 
network in 2017 resulted in an increase in transaction fees amounting to 18200% 
in December 2017 when compared to the start of the year.114 Thereafter, 
transaction fees dropped and in January 2018 stabilised at approximately double 
the average cost at the start of 2017. A number of hard forks (eg the Lightning 
Network)115 aimed at solving the scalability issues associated with transactions on 
the network are currently under development, with their ultimate goal being the 
restoration of Nakamoto’s original objective to allow Bitcoin usage for 
micropayments. 
At a more fundamental level, Bitcoin represents a shift in power from the 
sovereign State to the individual. It serves as a model for effective self-regulation, 
wherein ease of adoption and ease of forking replaces in-fighting and 
monopolistic inefficiencies inherent in Ogus’ original conception. The ideological 
and technical foundations of Bitcoin are inherently deregulatory to the extent that 
Nakamoto coded a veiled criticism of the 2009 German bailout into the 
blockchain’s ‘genesis block’.116 
                                                             
113 ‘Does It Make Sense to Use Bitcoin to Transfer Money to Yourself Internationally?’ 
(StackExchange, 24 May 2014) 
<https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/25583/does-it-make-sense-to-use-
bitcoin-to-transfer-money-to-yourself-internationally> accessed 5 May 2017. 
114 ‘Bitcoin Average Transaction Fee Historical Chart’ (BitInfoCharts) 
<https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-transactionfees.html> accessed 21 
February 2018. 
115 Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, ‘The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-
Chain Instant Payments’ (2016) <https://lightning.network/lightning-network-
paper.pdf> accessed 21 February 2018. 
116 For an explanation on what a genesis block entails, see ‘Genesis Block’ (Bitcoin Wiki) 
<https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block> accessed 5 May 2017. 
 
82 Bitcoin: The First Self-Regulating Currency? Vol. 3 
 
The key issue that will define the future of Bitcoin is stability. Unlike 
traditional currencies, Bitcoin’s stability does not derive from policy decisions at 
the State level. Instead, it is directly tied to supply-and-demand, with overall 
supply being limited in the long run by Nakamoto’s algorithm on mining 
difficulty. Ohnesorge argues that the significant volatility seen in the Bitcoin 
market in late 2017 hampers the cryptocurrency’s ability to act as a medium of 
exchange and a store-of-value, both of which are key economic functions of a 
currency.117 Notably, the shift in usage of Bitcoin from currency to investment 
has seen several ‘traditional’ Bitcoin users (eg darkweb merchants) move to 
Litecoin, Monero, and other altcoins to take payments.118 This suggests that 
Bitcoin has lost the key features that made it popular for anonymous transactions 
online (ie fast speed of payments, stable price, and a low regulatory burden for 
purchase and sale).119  
The inherent benefits of cryptocurrencies continue to have lasting appeal 
beyond the immediate value of each coin at a given time. The demand for a means 
through which to make digital payments free from government oversight and 
third-party intermediaries creates a userbase that is inherently ‘sticky’ and can 
continue to maintain critical mass beyond market fluctuations. These users form 
the core of the community, running nodes and mining for Bitcoin through periods 
of instability. In terms of longevity, it is this userbase that is Bitcoin’s best chance 
for survival.  
Whether cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are little more than a fad or whether 
they represent a broader shift towards individual empowerment within e-
commerce, it is remarkable that an experiment by an anonymous programmer has 
had this profound impact on our concept of (digital) wealth. It is apt to conclude 
by noting that Bitcoin has seen exponential growth throughout 2017, despite 
significant volatility and the late-2017 market crash.120 Increased mainstream use, 
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alongside growing interest amongst commercial investors, has elevated 
Nakamoto’s experiment to the status of de facto flagship cryptocurrency. Bitcoin 
daily trading activity has increased six-fold since 2013,121 having peaked at 
upwards of 353,000 confirmed unique transactions in December 2017.  
The long-term prospects of the platform remain unclear, with scalability 
and volatility presenting significant obstacles to Bitcoin’s status as a ‘legitimate’ 
currency. The rise in competing altcoins (eg Ethereum, Litecash) may also render 
Bitcoin obsolete, as has been seen among illicit traders. The consensus-building 
nature of the currency may ultimately give it the long-term adaptability needed to 
survive, as competing forks optimise the platform over several iterations. Without 
any form of centralised control over the cryptocurrency, the burden of ensuring 
Bitcoin’s survival falls solely upon its userbase. 
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